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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a framework for understanding the limits that exist in optimal policy design in
dynamic contexts. We consider the design of policies in the context of dynamic linear models.
Fundamental design limits exist for policy rules in such environments in the sense that any policy
rule embodies tradeoffs between the magnitudes of different frequency-specific components of the
variance. Hence policies that are effective in eliminating low frequency variance components of a
state variable can only do so at the cost of exacerbating high frequency variance components, and



















“The role of the economists in discussions of public policy seems to me to 
be to prescribe what should be done in light of what can be done, politics 
aside…” 
 





  This paper studies a number of issues related to the design of optimal policies in 
dynamic contexts.  Issues of policy design have experienced a renaissance in 
macroeconomics over the last decade, driven to a significant extent by the modern 
literature on monetary policy rules, a literature that was to an important extent initiated 
by Taylor (1993); Taylor (1999) contains a wide range of applications.  An important 
feature of the work on Taylor-type monetary policy rules is the importance that has been 
assigned in this literature to understanding how the evaluation of alternative policy rules 
involves assessing tradeoffs between various objectives, such as minimizing inflation, 
interest rates, and output volatility. 
  The analysis in this paper adds to this previous work on policy analysis by 
developing a theory of design limits to optimal policy.  Specifically, we model the effects 
of alternative control rules on a state variable in the frequency domain.  A frequency 
domain approach allows one to identify the frequency-specific components of the overall 
variance of the state variable.
1  Our analysis then identifies the ways in which different 
control rules affect the contributions of fluctuations at each frequency to the overall 
variance.  This approach allows us to develop an explicit characterization of the tradeoffs 
that exist between diminishing the variance contribution of one frequency and another.  
Examples of these tradeoffs in the control theory literature are the Bode and Poisson 
integral constraints; despite their importance in understanding the development of 
                                                 
1 Such an interpretation is standard in time series analysis and derives immediately from 
the spectral representation of a time series.  
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optimal policy, these types of constraints do not appear to have been previously exploited 
in the economics literature.  The sorts of abstract arguments we develop have natural 
implications for contexts such as monetary policy design.  Monetary policy rules are 
typically evaluated in terms of their ability to minimize fluctuations in state variables 
such as output and inflation.   
In this context, the design limits we develop imply that policy rules that are 
efficacious in reducing low (high) frequency fluctuations in output and inflation will 
inevitably exacerbate the magnitude of high (low) frequency fluctuations, in a way that 
we make precise.  These tradeoffs do not, of course, by themselves imply any particular 
ordering concerning the relative desirability of different policy rules.  Rather, these 
tradeoffs imply that any ordering must carefully account for how the policymaker 
assesses the frequency-specific components of fluctuations for the outcomes of interest. 
  The design limits we describe are model-specific in the sense that a particular 
model produces a particular characterization of the frequency-specific tradeoffs that exist 
in stabilizing the state variable the policymaker wishes to control.  In other words, 
different models imply different constraints on what a policymaker can achieve.  As such, 
these limits are an important complement to work on policy design in the presence of 
model uncertainty
2. Concerns over model uncertainty have motivated much recent 
research on the theoretical foundations of policy analysis; one example is the research 
program on robust policy construction initiated by Hansen and Sargent 
(2001,2002,2003). This work focuses on local model uncertainty, i.e. model uncertainty 
that is local to a given baseline model.  The interactions of policy design and model 
uncertainty in cases where model uncertainty is “global” in the sense that the space of 
potential models contains very different elements is explored in Brock, Durlauf, and West 
(2003).   That paper uses an explicit decision-theoretic formulation which treats the true 
model as an unknown variable and computes expected policy effects by “integrating out” 
the variable. An important next step in studying policy design is the integration of the 
limits we describe here into environments with global model uncertainty; some initial 
discussion along these lines is found in Brock and Durlauf (2003). 
                                                 
2See Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003) and Onatski and Williams (2002) for conceptual 
and operational issues that arise in specifying model uncertainty in economic models.   
  3
  Our goal in this paper is to focus on basic ideas rather than formalism.  Much of 
the work described here represents research in progress and we have felt free to be 
relatively speculative. Our hope is that the ideas we outline will stimulate others to 
pursue what we believe is an extremely promising research program. 
 
 
2. Design limits in linear systems: basic ideas 
 
  This section considers the construction of optimal policies for systems with a 
scalar state variable  t x  and a scalar control  t u ; such systems are known as Single Input 
Single Output or SISO systems.  In our analysis, we assume that a policymaker wishes to 




t Ex  (1) 
  
The law of motion for the state is  
 
  () 11 tt t t xA L x b u ξ −− =+ +  (2) 
 
where  t ξ  represents an unobserved zero mean random variable with associated Wold 
moving average representation 
 
  () tt WL ξ ν =  (3) 
 
The innovations  t ν  are assumed to have a common variance 
2
t Eν ; it is not necessary for 
our analysis that the error variances are constant.  We focus on feedback rules for the 
control, i.e. rules of the form 
 
  () 11 tt uF L x −− =−  (4)  
  4
 










x ALx b FLx WL
WL
v
LA L bLF L




if  () () 1 LA L bLF L −+  is invertible, which we will assume. 
  In evaluating the effects of the control  t u  on the state  t x , it is useful to contrast 
(1) with the law of motion of the state variable when there is no control, i.e. the control is 
set equal to zero every period; we designate this process as 
NC
t x .  Eq. (2) of course 
implies that the state variable with no control obeys 
 
  () 1
NC NC
tt t xA L x ξ − =+  (6) 
 
Equation (6) is known in the control literature as the free dynamics of the system.  In 
light of the loss function (1), one may interpret the optimal policy problem as identifying 
that choice of feedback rule that maximizes the difference between the variance of  
NC
t x  
and the variance of  t x . 
  In order to analyze the system (1)-(4), we will work in the frequency domain.  To 










= ∑ .  Using the notation  () ()( )
2
CC C ωω ω =− , this allows us to 





















−+ −+ ∫∫  (7) 
  
  5
where  () fξ ω  is the spectral density of  t ξ .
3  
Eq. (7) provides a way of identifying how the control rule - () FL affects each of  
the frequency specific components of 
2
t Ex .  To see this, multiply and divide the 
denominator of the integrand in (7) by ()
2 i eA
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(8) may be rewritten as 
 
  () ()
2 2
NC t x Ex S f d
π
π ωω ω
− =∫  (10) 
 
a representation that will prove to be of great use in understanding stabilization policy 
from a frequency domain perspective. 
In control theory,  () S ω  is known as the sensitivity function (cf. Kwakernaak and 
Sivan (1972), pg. 487).  Equation (10) illustrates how the sensitivity function  () S ω  plays 
a critical role in understanding policy design. The effects of a policy on a state are 
                                                 
3 The sorts of calculations we make here are standard in the control theory literature; see 
Kwakernaak and Sivan (1972, chapter 6) for an excellent exposition.  
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summarized by the sensitivity function; since  () NC x f ω  does not depend on the policy 
rule, all effects of the policy rule are determined by the effect of  () FL (and hence 
() F ω ) on  () S ω . This means that any restrictions that exist on the ability of the choice 
of  () FL to determine the shape of  () S ω  represent restrictions on how a policy can 
affect the variance of the state.  
Eq. (10) indicates how different choices of the policy rule alter the way in which 
each frequency component of  () NC x f ω  is transformed into an element of  () x f ω  and 
hence how each frequency-specific component of 
NC
t x  translates into a frequency-specific 




t x Ex f d
π
π ωω
− =∫  and  ()
2
tx Ex f d
π
π ωω
− =∫ , this 
transformation illustrates how the sensitivity function alters the frequency-specific 
variance contributions when 
NC
t x  is transformed into  t x  by the feedback rule.  When the 
policy rule has the implication that  ()
2
1 S ω < , then the contribution of fluctuations 
associated with frequency ω  to  () x f ω  are smaller than their effect on the state variable 
would be if  the control were set equal to zero, i.e.  () NC x f ω .  Hence, one way to think 
about policy design is that good policies will reduce the contributions of different values 
that are present in  () NC x f ω  as the policy rule transforms this spectral density into  () x f ω  
in a way to minimize the contributions of those frequencies where  () NC x f ω  is relatively 
large. 
What sorts of constraints exist on the choice of  () S ω  which may be achieved by 
the choice of  () FL?  It is intuitive that some such limits must exist, or else the 
policymaker would simply set  () [ ] 0 , S ωω π π =∀∈ −  and produce 
2 0 t Ex = .  (Such a 
rule is of course not realizable since the policymaker cannot condition on  t v ) A full 
characterization of the limits that exist in generating  () S ω  will provide a way of 
characterizing the fundamental limits that exist to feedback policies in this model.  
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Within the control theory literature, there is an important result, known as the 
Bode integral constraint, which characterizes the limits which the state equation imposes 
on the mapping from  () F ω  to  () S ω .  A discrete time version of this constraint is due to 
Wu and Jonckheere, (1992). In order to state this constraint, it is necessary to introduce a 
function  () Lz defined by 
 
  () () () ()
1
11 Lz b Fz z Az
−
−− =− (11) 
 









4 We consider the case where  () FL and  () AL are polynomials of finite 
degree.  By the fundamental theorem of algebra, this function may be written as a ratio of 





















where the constant c is determined by the requirement that the system defined by (1) to 
(4)  is stable. In the factorization, the quantities  i z  are the zeroes and the quantities  i p  are 
the poles of the function.  The difference between the number of poles and the number of 
zeroes,  nm ν =− , is known as the relative degree of  () Lz.  We assume that  1 ν ≥ .  This 
background allows us to state the following theorem 
 
Theorem.  Discrete Time Bode Constraint 
 
                                                 
4We have shifted from Fourier to z-transforms in order to allow us to define the function 
() L ⋅  on the entire complex plane, which is needed in the derivations of some of the 
results we employ.  
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Assume that the controlled system is globally asymptotically stable and that  1 ν ≥ . Then, 
there exists a non negative constant  Bode K  such that  
 








− == ∑ ∫  (13) 
 
where 
i u p  denotes an unstable pole of  () Lz.  
 
Pf. Wu and Jonckheere (1992). 
 
The key features of this theorem are twofold.  First, since  0 Bode K ≥  (which 
immediately follows from  () ln 0
i u p ≥  and the second equality in (13)), it is impossible 





− ∫  would be negative.  From the 
perspective of eq. (7) this implies that it is impossible to design a policy such that 
() () [ ]  -, NC x x ff ωω ω π π ≤∀ ∈  with strict inequality at some positive measure of 
frequencies.
5  In order to achieve  () () NC x x ff ωω < for every element of one set of 
frequencies, it is necessary that  () () NC x x ff ωω > for elements of some other nontrivial 
set. Since  ()   NC x f ω represents the frequency-specific variance contributions when the 
control is identically equal to zero, this means that any nontrivial policy must increase the 
variance contributions at certain frequencies relative to the contributions in absence of the 
policy.  Hence, there are fundamental tradeoffs between the variance contributions that 
collectively determine 
2
t Ex .  An optimal policy may incur higher variance contributions 
at some frequencies in order to reduce variance contributions at others, but such tradeoffs 
are inevitable. 
                                                 
5Hence, the fact that it is impossible to choose a control such that  () [ ] 0 , S ωω π π =∀∈ −  
is a special case of a much stronger set of restrictions on what feedback policies can 
achieve.  
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When will  0 Bode K > ?  A positive value for the constraint occurs when the 
polynomial  () 1 LA L −  has roots strictly outside the unit circle. Notice that unit root 
processes are compatible with  0 Bode K = .  We will treat  0 Bode K =  as a leading case since 
many macroeconomic models are associated with  () 1 LA L −  polynomials whose roots are 
outside or on the unit circle. 
The Bode integral constraint, in turn, provides a way of characterizing the optimal 
policy problem in the frequency domain.  Let  () p ω = ()
2
S ω .  The optimal policy rule 
implicitly chooses the  () p ω  that minimizes 
2
t Ex  subject to the constraint (13). Hence the 
optimal policy is determined by the   
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The first order necessary condition for this problem implies that for each 
frequency ω  the optimal  ()
* p ω fulfills 
 
  () () () ()
*





=→ =  (15) 
  
Eq. (15), in turn implies that the Fourier transform of the optimal feedback rule 
()
* FL − , ()
* F ω − , is implicitly defined by  
 



















which in turn implies that the optimal feedback rule is  
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  () () () ()
*1 1 1 FL b L W L L A L
−− − −= − −  (17) 
 
  The optimal policy rule has a simple interpretation.  Eq. (13) states the optimal 
policy rule shapes the function  ()
* p ω  so that  () ()
*
NC x fp ωω is constant across 
frequencies.  Recalling that  () ()
2
pS ωω =  and that  () () ()
2
NC x x fS f ωω ω = , this 
means that the optimal policy rule converts the initial process 
NC
t x  into a white noise 
process.  In other words, any predictability in the state is eliminated under an optimal 
policy.  This is precisely what one would expect from feedback rules of the form (3); 
predictability in the state is completely offset by the control. 
  Finally, we would note an intriguing implication of the Bode integral constraint 
for the analysis of policies in the presence of model uncertainty.  The value of the 
constant  Bode K  is model-specific, as indicated by eq. (12).  Models with unstable poles 
will thus produce different constraints on policy design than those where such poles are 
not present.  This suggests a new avenue across which model uncertainty can affect 
optimal policy design as a policymaker will need to pay particular attention to the 
implications of a policy for those models where  0 Bode K >  as such models imply that the 
cost of reducing variance at certain frequencies will be particularly high in the sense of 
creating especially large increases in variance at other frequencies.  
 
 
3. Applications  
 
  In this section we apply the basic ideas associated with optimal policy design in 
the presence of the Bode integral constraint to illustrate some of the insights that may be 
produced by this framework. 
 
 
i. tradeoffs between low and high frequency fluctuations 
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Suppose that a policymaker wishes to design a policy that works well when 
() NC x f ω  has the typical “Granger” spectral shape (Granger (1966), Sargent (1987)) so 
that () NC x f ω  is decreasing in  ω  with the possible exception of some local maxima and 
associated local increases around business cycle and seasonal frequencies.  This spectral 
density shape suggests that a policymaker might want to design a feedback rule that is 
designed to reduce the variance contributions of frequencies in some interval [ ] , ωω −  
that makes a relatively large contribution to the overall value of 
2
t Ex .  A strategy for 
doing this is to choose a feedback rule such that 
 
  () [ ] 1 , SM ωω ω ω ≤< ∀ ∈ −  (18) 
 
Following eq. (10), such a policy means that the variance contribution of the frequencies 
in the interval [ ] , ωω −  to 
2
t Ex  is 
 
  () () ()
2 2
NC NC xx Sfd Mfd
ωω ωω ωω ω ω ω
≤≤ ≤ ∫∫  (19) 
 
How will such a policy perform in light of the Bode integral constraint?  We 
focus on the case  0 Bode K = .  The sort of strategy described by (18) provides good control 
with respect to those frequencies that contribute the most power to 
2
t Ex  under the 
assumption of the typical Granger spectral shape.  However, this property comes at a 
price in the sense that it trades off good performance at low frequencies for poor 
performance at high frequencies.    
  The magnitude of the potential cost may be given a lower bound. If  0 Bode K = , 
then by the Bode integral formula, 
 
  () () () ( ) ()
[] ,
1
0 ln 2 ln ln
2
Bode KS d M S d
π
πω ω ω ωωω ωω











∉− ≥>  (21) 
  
Equation (21) illustrates the critical implication of the Bode integral constraint 
that   () 1 S ω >  is unavoidable for some frequencies and thus shows how the success of a 
policymaker in controlling variance due to high spectral power at one frequency band 
requires exacerbation of the variance contribution of another frequency band.  As a result, 
if we consider the variance contribution of frequencies outside the interval [ ] , ωω −  to 
2






NC x Sf d
ωω ω ωω ω
∉− ∫  (22) 
 
it is clear that this contribution can be quite large, especially if  () NC x f ω  has a local 
maximum in the set  ωω >  as might occur, for example, via the Christmas cycle stressed 
by Barsky and Miron (1989).  The implication of our analysis is that while policies of the 
form (18) would seem to be a natural implication of the assumption of the Granger 
spectral shape, such policies can prove to be ineffective (and even, at least in principle, 
counterproductive) if the implied costs of the policy in terms of increasing the variance 
contributions of frequencies  [ ] , ωω ω ∉−  are such as to magnify local maxima in the 
spectral density of 
NC
t x     
 
 
ii. local robustness analysis 
 
  Within macroeconomics, one important new area of policy analysis has focused 
on the design of robust policies.  Following the seminal contributions of Hansen and 
Sargent (2001,2002,2003), this research addresses the question of how a policymaker can  
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design policies  that account for uncertainty about the model of the economy.  Important 
recent contributions include Giannoni (2002), Massamiliano and Salmon (2002), Onatski 
and Stock (2002) and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001).  
  Brock and Durlauf (2003) provide an analysis of local robustness for the system 
we have described in Section 2.  We summarize their basic argument.  Suppose that there 
exists model uncertainty with respect to the temporal structure of the innovations,  t ξ .  
We do this by introducing uncertainty about the spectral density () fξ ω .  Specifically, 
relative to a baseline  () fξ ω , the true spectral density lies in the set defined by  
 
  () () ()
2 2 ffd
π
ξξ π ωω ω ε
− −≤ ∫  (23) 
 
Let  ()
* fξ ω  denote (for the policymaker) the least favorable model in this set. 
When  ε  is small, arguments in Brock and Durlauf (2003) show that the least 
favorable model can be determined by identifying the marginal effect of an increase in 
() fξ ω  on (23) and allocating the changes in a such a way that the ratio of the changes is 
equal to the ratio of the marginal effects on 
2
t Ex .
6  The marginal effect of a change in the 
value of  () fξ ω  at a given frequency on 
2
t Ex , is  () ()
2 * i pe A
ω ωω − ; this follows 
immediately from the frequency definition of the variance and the envelope theorem.  
Combining this with eq. (16), which describes the policymaker’s feedback rule at the 
baseline spectral density, Brock and Durlauf (2003) show that the least favorable spectral 
density must fulfill 
 
















− =+ +  (24) 
 
                                                 
6 This is an indirect way of saying the ratio of the costs in changing  () fξ ω  as embodied 
in (24) must equal the ratio of the benefits of the changes, and so is hardly a surprise from 
the perspective of basic price theory!  
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Eq. (24) means that the least favorable model with respect to the baseline has the property 
that the difference between the baseline and the least favorable model is smaller when the 
baseline spectral density is relatively larger; conversely, the differences between the 
baseline and the least favorable model are larger when the baseline spectral density is  
relatively small.  The intuition from this finding is driven by the logic of the optimal 
policy problem as affected by the Bode constraint.  Those frequencies against which the 
optimal policy provides the smallest downweighting are those where the marginal harm 
of additional power is greatest.  The example illustrates how the use of the Bode integral 
can facilitate calculations of robust versions of optimal policies. 
 
 
iii. policy design with uncertain policy effects 
 
While robustness analysis focuses on local model uncertainty, in the sense that the space 
of possible models represents a shroud around an initial baseline model, many forms of 
model uncertainty are clearly not local.  One example of this occurs in the context of 
policy analysis when the effects of the control are uncertain.  This type of problem is 
represented by Milton Friedman’s (Friedman (1948)) famous criticism of activist 
monetary rule on the grounds that the effects of monetary policy are subject to “long and 
variable lags.”  We can formalize Friedman’s idea in the context of a state equation of the 
form 
 
  () () 11 tt t t xA L x B L u ξ −− =++  (25) 
 
and analyzing control design when  () AL and  () fξ ω  are known but  () B L  is unknown.  
Following our earlier strategy, we will exploit the fact that  () NC x f ω  does not depend on 
() B L .  Let Θ  denote the set of potential values of  () B L  with respect to which the 
policymakers seeks to design a “good” control.   
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Suppose that  () NC x f ω  displays the typical Granger spectral shape.  Define a set of 
frequencies  [ ] , ωω −  such that  () f e ξ ω ≤  for  [ ] , ωω ω ∉−  where e  is small positive 
number.  Suppose that a policymaker designs a control so that the associated sensitivity 
function  () S ω  has the property 
 
  () [ ] () 1 ,   and    SB L ωω ω ω <∀∈ − ∀ ∈ Θ  (26) 
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From the perspective of design limits, the question is how a policy which fulfills (26) 
performs relative to the last two terms in (27).  Under the assumption that the system is 
stable for all lag structures in Θ  (so that  0 Bode K = ) and letting  [] () , sup SS ωπ π ω ∞ ∈− = , 








ln ln 2 ln 2 2 ln
Sd






















∞ ≥  (29) 
 
  This formula illustrates how the strategy described by (26) can expose the 
policymaker to a large sensitivity peak; the inequality in (29) represents a lower bound on 
the weight assigned to some frequencies given the control rule.  In parallel to our earlier 
arguments, from the perspective of designing good controls, the issue in minimizing  
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NC x Sf d
ωω ω ωω ω







NC NC xx Sf d M f d
ω
πω
ωω ω ωω ω ωω ω ω ω
−
−
∉− ∉− ≥ ∫∫  (30) 
 
so, policy rules that account for the uncertainty in the effects of the control on the state in 




iv. measurement error 
 
  The theory of design limits may also be applied to study how to design good 
controls in the presence of measurement error.  Problems of this type naturally arise in 
monetary policy contexts, for example, where measurement of relevant variables such as 
potential output or the natural rate of unemployment can be problematic; see Orphanides 
and Williams (2002) for a recent example. 
  To see how design limits apply to measurement error, suppose that the true state 
variable  t x  obeys the process described by eq. (2) but that state is unobservable; the 
measured level of the state,  
m




tt t x xn =+ (31) 
 
where  t n  is measurement error. Control equations can of course only be constructed as 




tt uF L x =−  (32) 
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To understand how measurement error affects the choice of control rule, we 
assume that  t ξ  is zero.
7 In this case, the variance of the state is 
 
  () ()
2
2 1 tn Ex S f d
π
π ωω ω
− =− ∫  (33) 
 
which indicates that the control should be chosen so that  ()1 S ω −  is relatively small 
when  () n f ω  is relatively large.  Notice that relative to the earlier formulas one is now 
concerned with the spectral density of the measurement error and not the true state.  Also, 
the weighting scheme is no longer  ()
2
S ω  but  ()
2
1 S ω − . The difference in these 
weights reflects the fact that the policy rule wishes to damp out the effects of the 
measurement error in inducing volatility in  t x  because of the feedback rule, not because 
of volatility that is intrinsic to 
NC
t x . 
 
 
v. non-time separable preferences 
 
  The frequency domain perspective on policy limits provides some interesting 
insights into the design of optimal policies in the presence of non-time separable 
preferences (NTS).  As argued in recent work such as Otrok (2001), Otrok, Ravikumar, 
and Whiteman (2002), the standard time separable preferences used in macroeconomics 
may fail to properly account for the fact that economic actors are sensitive to the 
frequency of shocks. Accounting for this may have important macroeconomic 
implications. For example, Otrok, Ravikumar, and Whiteman (2002) show how non-time 
separability can explain the equity premium puzzle.  We apply the analysis of Section 2 
to the design of policies in the presence of NTS preferences. We do this by contrasting a 
standard set of time separable preferences  
                                                 
7 One might object that if  () [ ] 0 , fξ ωω π π =∀∈ − , there is no control problem that needs 
to be addressed.  Our purpose in this assumption is to highlight an implication of 














− ∑  (34) 
 
with non-time separable preferences of the form 
 












−− ∑  (35) 
 
  These alternative preference structures illustrate that the difference between the 
payoffs under time separable and non-separable cases is determined by the difference 
between 
2
t Ex  and  ()
2
1 tt Ex x δ − − .  From eq. (7), it is immediately the case that 
()
2
1 tt Ex x δ − − = () ()
2












































where we have used the identities  ()
2 2
1
ii i ee e
ωω ω δδ




ω − = . It is 
straightforward to verify, using the analysis underlying (16) and (17) that 
() ()
1 FL bAL
− =  when  0 δ = .  
To see how non-time separable preferences affect optimal policy, we consider the 





= ; we also normalize so that  1 b =  .  For 




11 tt uF x δ −− =−  (37)  
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where the coefficient  () F δ  reflects the dependence of the feedback parameter on δ .  To 












































Hence, the effects of habit persistence on optimal policy are determined by the behavior 
of 
2 12c o s δω δ −+ .  This function is monotonically decreasing in  ω  if  0 δ > .   
  In order to solve for  () F δ , we proceed as follows.  The second integral in (38) 





































Differentiation of (39) with respect to δ  produces a quadratic equation.  Setting this 
quadratic equal to 0 in order to minimize (39)  and choosing the relevant root leads to the 
formula 
 
  () 0 Fa δδ =−  (40) 
 
To understand the intuition behind this formula, consider a feedback rule  () FL −  such 
that   
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  () () AL b FL δ −=  (41) 
 
When  t ξ  is uncorrelated, this rule implies that all correlation in  1 tt x x δ − −  has been 
eliminated by the feedback rule.  Following the analysis of (17), this means the rule is 
optimal.   
 
 
4. Multivariate systems 
  
  Our discussion thus far has focused on SISO models.  There is also a rich 
literature on multiple input multiple output (MIMO) systems that is of particular 
importance in contexts where the policymaker wishes to control several state variables, as 
occurs for a monetary authority who cares about output and inflation volatility.  The 
theory of design limit for MIMO systems is relatively less developed than for SISO 
systems; important contributions include Chen (1995) and Chen and Nett (1995).  We 
consider the case where there are two states and one control. 
  We consider a system for two state variables  1,t x  and  2,t x . The equations for these 
states are  
 




  2, 21 1. 1 22 2, 1 2 1 2, tt t t t xa x a x b uξ −− − =++ +  (43) 
 
which in matrix form is  
 
  11 tt t t xA x b u ξ −− =++  (44) 
 
Models of this type are common in the macroeconomics literature.  For example, 
Onatski and Stock (2001) consider a model of this type in which a policymaker attempts  
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to stabilize inflation and the output gap using a short run interest rate as the control. 
Onatski and Stock restrict their analysis to evaluate policies that lie in a set of Taylor 
rules.  In our context, this would mean that policies are taken from the set T defined by 
 
  11 , 22 , { s u c h  t h a t   } tt t t t Tu ug xg x g x ′ == + =  (45) 
 
Our objective is to derive some comparisons with the SISO case we have already 
discussed. To do this, one first considers the matrix generalization of the sensitivity 
function.  The 22 ×  sensitivity matrix  () S ω  is defined as 
 
  () () ( ) ()
1 1 i SI I e I A b g
ω ω
− −
′ =++ −  (46) 
 
where I  is the identity matrix.   
We have been unable to uncover an explicit formula for the Bode integral 
constraint for multivariate discrete time systems that represents a direct generalization of 
(13), although there are a number of results available that consider design limits in such 
systems (cf. Chen and Nett (1993,1995) and Chen (1995)). We conjecture that the 
multivariate analog of the sensitivity formula is  
 
  () () ( ) ()
2






− == ∑ ∫  (47) 
 
 In this case, the terms 
i u p  represent unstable roots of the matrix  A in eq. (44) . Letting 
() Sz denote the z-transform that corresponds to the sensitivity matrix defined by (46) 
 














While we are in the process of attempting to develop a proof of (47), we emphasize that 
we have not done so.
8  At the same time, the arguments we make below can be readily 
modified if we turn out to be incorrect in this conjecture and so we proceed on the basis 
that (47) holds in order to illustrate the design limits ideas. 
  In order to see how (47) constrains the design of policy, we employ the 
relationship 
 
  () () () () ()
22 2
11




ππ ωω σ ω ω
−−
==
= ∑∑ ∫∫  (49) 
 
where, for a fixed ω ,  () () k S σω denotes the singular values of () S ω .
9  Let the norm 
S
∞  be defined as the largest singular value of  () S ω  where ω  is allowed to vary 
between  π −  and π .  In analogy to (18), one can consider the effects of policies that 
impose 
 
  [ ] , SM ωω ω
∞ ≤∀ ∈ −  (50) 
 
This expression is more complicated than (18) because we are now working with a 
sensitivity matrix function.  If one combines (47) and (50),  
 








ωπ π ππ σω ω σω ∈− −−
=




                                                 
8 The continuous time analog to (48) is readily available in the control literature, cf. 
Skogestad and Postlethwaite (1996, eq. 6.3, pg. 215). 
9 The singular value of a complex valued 2 2 ×  matrix S  are the square roots of the 
eigenvalues of the matrix 
H SS  where 
H S  is the complex transpose of S , cf. Skogestad 
and Postlethwaite (1996, pg. 503).  The singular values are ordered so that for each ω , 
() () () () 12 SS σω σω ≤ .  
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  () 0 2 ln 2 2 ln M S ωπ ω
∞ ≤+ −  (52) 
 







∞ ≥  (53) 
 
This bound indicates how the basic principles we have described for univariate 
systems apply to multivariate systems, namely, reduction of variance associated with low 
frequencies can produce high variance contributions from high frequencies. In principle, 
it should be possible to obtain tighter bounds on the effect of strategy (50) on the 
magnification of high frequency components using methods such as those developed in 
Zhou, Doyle, and Glover (1998, chapter 6); we leave this to future work. 
While the basic principles of design limits extend naturally from SISO to MIMO 
systems, there are interesting differences because design limits apply to frequency-
specific components of variance both within and across the state variables.  Put 
differently, in the SISO case, design limits always expose a policymaker to undesirable 
effects outside the range of frequencies which are targeted by the policymaker. In the 
MIMO case these undesirable effects themselves will embody tradeoffs with respect to 





                                                 
10There are also important technical differences between SISO and MIMO systems. First, 
in the SISO case, if the controlled system is stable, then  () () ln S ω  is harmonic outside 
the unit disk, whereas in MIMO systems, even if  () S ω  is analytic,  () () ln S ω  is not 
harmonic in general where, for the case of matrix  () S ω ,  () S ω  denotes the largest 
singular value of  () S ω  at ω  (Hara and Sung (1989, pg. 890)).  Second, both the 
locations of unstable poles and zeros as well as their directions affect the constraints in 
MIMO systems (Hara and Sung (1989, pg. 890)).  Similar differences are discussed in 
Chen (1995) and Chen and Nett (1993, 1995).  
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5. Summary and conclusions 
 
This paper has attempted to outline some basic issues that arise in the design of 
optimal policies in dynamic economic systems.  Borrowing ideas from the control 
engineering literature, it is possible to precisely delineate the limitations that a 
policymaker faces in designing feedback policies.  These limits, which are summarized 
by a remarkable formula known as the Bode integral constraint, illustrate how any 
feedback policy is forced to make tradeoffs among the frequency-specific components of 
the state variables that a policymaker wishes to stabilize.   We have suggested how these 
tools can elucidate policy design issues that arise in the presence of local and global 
model uncertainty as well as in the face of measurement error.  These applications 
represent only a hint of the potential of these methods for understanding policy design in 
macroeconomics and other areas of economics.   
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